E. Responsibi	lities of the Board	·		
E.1	Board Duties and Responsibilities	and cornorate governance policy	Y/ N	Reference/ Source document
E.1.1	Clearly defined board responsibilities Does the company disclose its	OECD PRINCIPLE V: Disclosure and Transparency		T
E.1.1	corporate governance policy / board charter?	(A) Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 8. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented.	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.1.2	Are the types of decisions requiring board of directors/commissioners' approval disclosed ?		Υ	http://praxisfidembai.webs.com/reports
E.1.3	Are the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors/commissioners clearly	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D)	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.1.4		OECD PRINCIPLE 6 (P58) ICGN:3.2 Integrity ICGN:3.2 Integrity The board is responsible for overseeing the implementation and maintenance of a culture of integrity. The board should encourage a culture of integrity permeating all aspects of the co., and secure that its vision, mission and objectives are ethically	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.1.5	Has the board review the vision and mission/strategy in the last financial year?		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.1.6	Does the board of directors monitor/oversee the implementation of the corporate strategy?		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2	Board structure Code of Ethics or Conduct			
E.2.1	or conduct disclosed?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (C) The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests of stakeholders. The board has a key role in setting the ethical tone of a company, not only by its own actions, but also in appointing and overseeing key	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.2	Does the company disclose that all directors/commissioners, senior management and employees are required to comply with the code?	executives and consequently the management in general. High ethical standards are in the long term interests of the company as a means to make it credible and trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term commitments. To make the objectives of the board clear and operational, many companies have found it useful to develop company codes of conduct based on, inter alia, professional standards and sometimes broader codes of behaviour. The latter might	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.3	Does the company disclose how it implements and monitors compliance with the code of ethics or conduct?	include a voluntary commitment by the company (including its subsidiaries) to comply with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which reflect all four principles contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Labour Rights. Company-wide codes serve as a standard for conduct by both the board	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.4	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity with respect to management with important implications for the composition and structure of the board. Board independence in these circumstances usually requires that a sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of management. The ASX Code recommends at least a majority of independent directors, while the UK Code recommends at least half of the board, excluding the Chairman, be independent directors. The minimum of three independent directors is to ensure that companies with small boards have enough independent directors (note that stock exchange rules often require at least two independent directors).	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.2.5	Are the independent directors/commissioners independent of management and major/ substantial shareholders?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity with respect to management with important implications for the composition and structure of the board. Board independence in these circumstances usually requires that a sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of management.	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.6	Does the company have a term limit of nine years or less for its independent directors/commissioners?	The variety of board structures, ownership patterns and practices in different countries will thus require different approaches to the issue of board objectivity. In many instances objectivity requires that a sufficient number of board members not be employed by the company or its affiliates and not be closely related to the company or its management through significant economic, family or other ties. This does not prevent shareholders from being board members. In others, independence from	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.7	Has the company set a limit of five board seats that an individual independent/non-executive director/commissioner may hold simultaneously?	UK CODE (JUNE 2010): Non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms subject to re-election and to statutory provisions relating to the removal of a director. Any term beyond six years for a non-executive director should be subject to particularly rigorous review, and should take into account the need for progressive refreshing of the board and to succession for appointments to the board and to senior management, so as to maintain an appropriate balance of skills and experience within the company and on the board.	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.8	on a total of more than five boards	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (3) Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities. Service on too many boards can interfere with the performance of board members. Companies may wish to consider whether multiple	N	
E.2.9	Does the company have any executive directors who serve on more than two boards of listed companies outside of the group? Nominating Committee	board memberships by the same person are compatible with effective board performance and disclose the information to shareholders.	N	

E.2.10	Does the company have a Nominating Committee (NC)?	OECD PRINCIPLE II (C) (3) Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such as the nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. Shareholders should be able to make their views	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.11	Does the Nominating Committee comprise of a majority of independent directors/commissioners?	known on the remuneration policy for board members and key executives. The equity component of compensation schemes for board members and employees should be subject to shareholder approval.	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.2.12	Is the chairman of the Nominating Committee an independent director/commissioner?	This item is in most codes of corporate governance.	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.13	Does the company disclose the terms of reference/ governance structure/charter of the Nominating Committee?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (2) When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they		http://operiofideesheid.voolog.com/DDAVISO/20FIDESO/20
		may also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board and of individual board members. In order to evaluate the merits of board committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.14	Did the Nominating Committee meet at least twice during the year?	Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.15	Is the attendance of members at Nominating Committee meetings disclosed? Remuneration Committee/	accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.16	Compensation Committee Does the company have a	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D)	1	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
E.2.17	Remuneration Committee? Does the Remuneration Committee	(4) Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders.	Y	MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
	comprise of a majority of independent directors/commissioners?	It is considered good practice in an increasing number of countries that remuneration policy and employment contracts for board members and key executives be handled by a special committee of the board comprising either wholly or a majority of independent directors. There	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.18	Is the chairman of the Remuneration Committee an independent director/commissioner?	are also calls for a Remuneration Committee that excludes executives that serve on each others' Remuneration Committees, which could lead to conflicts of interest.	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.19	Does the company disclose the terms of reference/ governance structure/ charter of the Remuneration Committee?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (2) When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board.	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
F 2 20	Did the Berry westing Committee	While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they may also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board		
E.2.20	Did the Remuneration Committee meet at least twice during the year?	and of individual board members. In order to evaluate the merits of board committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is particularly important in an increasing number of	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.2.21	Is the attendance of members at Remuneration Committee meetings disclosed?	jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.22	Audit Committee Does the company have an Audit	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)		
L.2.22	Committee?	(1) Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and board remuneration.	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.23	Does the Audit Committee comprise entirely of non-executive directors/commissioners with a majority of independent directors/commissioners?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (2) When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board.		
		While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they may also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board and of individual board members. In order to evaluate the merits of board committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is particularly important in the increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.2.24	Is the chairman of the Audit			
	Committee an independent director/commissioner?		Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.2.25	Does the company disclose the terms of reference/governance structure/charter of the Audit		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.26	Does the Annual Report disclose the profile or qualifications of the Audit Committee members?	Most codes specify the need for accounting/finance expertise or experience.	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
<u> </u>			1	

F 2 27	Door at least one of the independent	LIV CODE (ILINE 2010)		Т
E.2.27	Does at least one of the independent directors/commissioners of the	C.3.1. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the		
	committee have accounting	Audit Committee has recent and relevant financial experience.		
	expertise (accounting qualification			http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
	or experience)?	As many of the key responsibilities of the Audit Committee are	Y	MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
		accounting-related, such as oversight of financial reporting and audits, it		
		is important to have someone specifically with accounting expertise, not just general financial expertise.		
E.2.28	Did the Audit Committee meet at	just general illianelai expertise.		
E.Z.Z0	least four times during the year?			
	,		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
				MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.2.29	Is the attendance of members at		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
	Audit Committee meetings disclosed?		'	MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.2.30	Does the Audit Committee have	UK CODE (JUNE 2010)		
	primary responsibility for recommendation on the	C.3.6 The Audit Committee should have primary responsibility for making a recommendation on the appointment, reappointment and		
	appointment, and removal of the	removal of the external auditor. If the board does not accept the Audit		
	external auditor?	Committee's recommendation, it should include in the Annual Report,		
		and in any papers recommending appointment or re-appointment, a	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
		statement from the Audit Committee explaining the recommendation		WIDTH CHINACH CONCEDED 2. Par
		and should set out reasons why the board has taken a different position.		
E.3	Board Processes			
	Board meetings and attendance			
E.3.1	Are the board of directors meeting	Scheduling board meetings before or at the beginning of the year would		
	scheduled before the start of financial year?	allow directors to plan ahead to attend such meetings, thereby helping to maximise participation, especially as non-executive directors often		hater//americal-selection
	imanear year.	have other commitments. Additional ad hoc meetings can always be	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
		scheduled if and when necessary. It is common practice for boards in		
		developed markets to schedule meetings in this way.	<u> </u>	
E.3.2	Does the board of	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6		
	directors/commissioners meet at	(VI.I.24) Does the board meet at least six times per year?		
	least six times during the year?	INDO SCORECARD		hard the sector of the sector
		E.10. How many meetings were held in the past year?	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
		If the board met more than six times, the firm earns a 'Y' score. If four to		WIDTH CHINACH CONCEDENCE OF CO
		six meetings, the firm was scored as 'fair', while less than four times was		
		scored as 'N'		
E.3.3	Has each of the	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)		
	least 75% of all the board meetings	(3) Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities.		
	held during the year?	their responsibilities.		
	,	Specific limitations may be less important than ensuring that members	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
		of the board enjoy legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of	Y	MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
		shareholders. Achieving legitimacy would also be facilitated by the		
		publication of attendance records for individual board members (e.g. whether they have missed a significant number of meetings) and any		
		other work undertaken on behalf of the board and the associated		
E.3.4	Does the company require a	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(VI.I.28) Is there a minimum quorum of at least 2/3 for board decisions		
	board decisions?	to be valid?	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
				MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
E.3.5	Did the non-executive	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6		
E.3.3	directors/commissioners of the	(VI.E.1.6) Does the corporate governance framework requires or		
	company meet separately at least	encourages boards to conduct executive sessions?		
	once during the year without any			
	executives present?		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
				MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
	Access to information		_ 	
E.3.6	Are board papers for board of directors/commissioners meetings	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (F) In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have		
	provided to the board at least five	access to accurate, relevant and timely information.		
	business days in advance of the	,,		
	•	Board members require relevant information on a timely basis in order	I	
	board meeting?			1
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not		
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within		
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not	v	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the	Y	
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board	Υ	
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the	Y	
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely	Υ	
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6	Y	
	board meeting?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.F.2) Does such information need to be provided to the board at least	Y	
E.3.7	Does the company secretary play a	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6	Y	
E.3.7	Does the company secretary play a significant role in supporting the	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.F.2) Does such information need to be provided to the board at least five business days in advance of the board meeting? OECD PRINCIPLE VI (F)	Y	
E.3.7	Does the company secretary play a significant role in supporting the board in discharging its	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.F.2) Does such information need to be provided to the board at least five husiness days in advance of the board meeting? OECD PRINCIPLE VI (F) ICSA Guidance on the Corporate Governance Role of the Company		
E.3.7	Does the company secretary play a significant role in supporting the board in discharging its responsibilities? Is the company secretary trained in	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.F.2) Does such information need to be provided to the board at least five business days in advance of the board meeting? OECD PRINCIPLE VI (F) ICSA Guidance on the Corporate Governance Role of the Company Secretary WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6	Y	
	Does the company secretary play a significant role in supporting the board in discharging its responsibilities?	to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.F.2) Does such information need to be provided to the board at least five business days in advance of the board meeting? OECD PRINCIPLE VI (F) ICSA Guidance on the Corporate Governance Role of the Company Secretary		

E.3.11 Are all the directon/commissioners? Are all the directon/commissioners? CGH 2.9.1 Betton of directors: Directors should be conscious of their every time years? Betton of directors: Directors should be conscious of their every time years? Betton of directors: Directors should be conscious of their every time years? Betton of directors: Directors should be conscious of their every time years? Betton of directors: Directors: Directors should be conscious of their every time years? Betton of directors: Directors: Directors should be conscious of their every time years? Betton of directors: Directors: Directors should be conscious of their every time years? Betton of directors: Directors should be consciously by less greater and in them exact directors should state of bedton and an annual basis. Between directors should state of bedton and an annual basis. Between directors should be eventualform one or every time years, thought they should be eventualform one or every time years, thought they should be eventualform one or every time? But the should be the should be eventualform one or every time? But the should be the should be eventualform one or every time? But the should be the should be eventualform one or every time? But the should be the should be eventualform one or every time? But the should be the should be eventualform one or every time? But the should be the should be eventualform one or every time? But the should be the should be eventualform or eventual to the longer term or eventual to the should be eventualform or eventual to the longer term or eventual to the should be eventualform or eventualform. But the should be the should be eventualform or					
### Accordance of the control of the	L.3.3	criteria used in selecting new	To further improve the selection process, the Principles also call for full disclosure of the experience and background of candidates for the board and the nomination process, which will allow an informed assessment of the abilities and suitability of each candidate. OECD Principle VI (D) (5) Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process. These Principles promote an active role for shareholders in the nomination and election of board members. The board has an essential role to play in ensuring that this and other aspects of the nominations and election process are respected. First, while actual procedures for nomination may differ among countries, the board or a nomination committee has a special responsibility to make sure that established procedures are transparent and respected. Second, the board has a key role in identifying potential members for the board with the appropriate knowledge, competencies and expertise to complement the existing skills of the board and thereby improve its value-adding potential for the company. In several countries there are calls for an open search process	Y	
constitution as beast one exceeding control of the	E.3.10	process followed in appointing new		Y	
Does the company disclose its expense of the company and its shareholders. Semeth in- kind and other ements policy/practices (i.e., the use of short term and long term incentives and performance commences) policy/practices (i.e., the use of short term and long term incentives and performance commences) policy/practices (i.e., the use of short term and long term incentives and performance commences and long term incentives and performance covering bound members and key executives. Such policy statements covering bound members and key executives. Such policy statements covering bound members and expressions. Policy statements are covering bound members and expressions. Policy statements are covering bound members for extra bound activities, such as consultine. They also often specify terms to be observed by board members for payments to be observed by board members of the company, want the procedures to be followed in granting and re-pricing of oldprises, in some countries, body as body in the procedure to be considered by board members of the company, want the procedures to be followed in granting and re-pricing of oldprises, in some countries. In procedure to be deviced by board members of the company, want the procedures to be followed in granting and re-pricing of oldprises. In some countries to be observed by board members of the structure for non-executive directors allows an are considered to a second the procedure of the company, and the procedure of the company was an area of the company, and the procedure of the company was an area of the company, and the procedure of the company was an area of the company was an area of the company o	E.3.11	subject to re-election at least once every three years?	Election of directors: Directors should be conscious of their accountability to shareholders, and many jurisdictions have mechanisms to ensure that this is in place on an ongoing basis. There are some markets however where such accountability is less apparent and in these each director should stand for election on an annual basis. Elsewhere directors should stand for election at least once every three years, though they should face evaluation more frequently. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.I.18) Can the re-election of board members be staggered over time? (Staggered boards are those where only a part of the board is re-elected	Υ	DEFAULT
remuneration (flex. allowance, benefit-in-kind and where encoluments) policy/practices (i.e. the use of short terms and performance measures) for its executive directors and CEO? be considered in the CEO. be considered in CEO. and CEO? be considered in CEO. be considered in CEO. and CEO. be considered in CEO. be consid	E 2.42	-	OECD DRINGIBLE VILID		
structure for non-executive directors/commissioners? D.1.3 Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Disclosure of fee structure for non-executive directors allows shareholders to assess if these directors are remunerated in an appropriate manner, for example, whether they are paid for taking on additional responsibilities and contributions, such as fairing disclosure of the executive directors and/or the senior executive directors and/or the senior executives? Do the shareholders or the Board of DECP PRINCIPLE VI. (D.4) The Board should fulfil certain key functions including aligning key executives and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. ICGN 2.3 (D) and (E) D. Selecting, remunerating, monitoring and where necessary replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning. E.3.15 Do independent non-executive directors and/or the secutives and executives and board remuneration with the longer term UK CODE (JUNE 2010) (C) (3.1) levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Remuneration for non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements. If, by exception, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be held until at least one year after the non-executive director should not include share options could be relevant to the determination of a non-executive director increases and the role executive director remuneration Companies may find it useful to consider the following when considering non-executive director increases the role of the role. Should not normally participate in schemes designed for the remuneration of executives. 1. Non-executive directors should not receive options or obnus gayments. 3. Non-executive directors should not receive options or obnus gayments. 3. Non		remuneration (fees, allowances, benefit-in-kind and other emoluments) policy/practices (i.e. the use of short term and long term incentives and performance measures) for its executive directors and CEO?	(4) Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. In an increasing number of countries it is regarded as good practice for boards to develop and disclose a remuneration policy statement covering board members and key executives. Such policy statements specify the relationship between remuneration and performance, and include measurable standards that emphasise the longer run interests of the company over short term considerations. Policy statements generally tend to set conditions for payments to board members for extra-board activities, such as consulting. They also often specify terms to be observed by board members and key executives about holding and trading the stock of the company, and the procedures to be followed in granting and re-pricing of options. In some countries, policy also covers the payments to be made when terminating the contract of an executive	N	
Directors approve the remuneration of the executive directors and/or the senior executives? ICAS 2, (D) and (E) D. Selecting, remunerating, monitoring and where necessary replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning. E. Aligning key executives and Board remuneration with the longer term that professional directors/commissioners received options, performance shares or bonuses? Do independent non-executive directors/commissioners received options, performance shares or bonuses? UK CODE (JUNE 2010) (D.1.3) Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Remuneration for non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements. If, by exception, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be held until at least one year after the non-executive director leaves the board. Holding of share options could be relevant to the determination of a non-executive director's independence (as set out in provision B.1.1). ASX CODE Box 8.2: Guidelines for non-executive director remuneration: 1. Non-executive directors should normally be remunerated by way of fees, in the form of cash, noncash benefits, superannuation contributions or salary sacrifice into equity; they should not normally participate in schemes designed for the remuneration of executives. 2. Non-executive directors should not be provided with retirement benefits other than superannuation. 3. Non-executive directors should not be provided with retirement benefits other than superannuation.	E.3.13	structure for non-executive	D.1.3 Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Disclosure of fee structure for non-executive directors allows shareholders to assess if these directors are remunerated in an appropriate manner, for example, whether they are paid for taking on	Y	
Do independent non-executive directors/commissioners receive options, performance shares or bonuses? UK CODE (JUNE 2010) (D.1.3) Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Remuneration for non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements. If, by exception, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be level until at least one year after the non-executive director leaves the board. Holding of share options could be relevant to the determination of a non-executive director's independence (as set out in provision B.1.1). ASX CODE Box 8.2: Guidelines for non-executive director remuneration Companies may find it useful to consider the following when considering non-executive director remuneration: 1. Non-executive directors should normally be remunerated by way of fees, in the form of cash, noncash benefits, superannuation contributions or salary sacrifice into equity; they should not normally participate in schemes designed for the remuneration of executives. 2. Non-executive directors should not receive options or bonus payments. 3. Non-executive directors should not be provided with retirement benefits other than superannuation.	E.3.14	Directors approve the remuneration of the executive directors and/or the	The Board should fulfil certain key functions including aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. ICGN 2.3 (D) and (E) D. Selecting, remunerating, monitoring and where necessary replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning.	Υ	
	E.3.15	directors/commissioners receive options, performance shares or	UK CODE (JUNE 2010) (D.1.3) Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Remuneration for non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements. If, by exception, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be held until at least one year after the non-executive director leaves the board. Holding of share		
<u> </u>			ASX CODE Box 8.2: Guidelines for non-executive director remuneration Companies may find it useful to consider the following when considering non-executive director remuneration: 1. Non-executive directors should normally be remunerated by way of fees, in the form of cash, noncash benefits, superannuation contributions or salary sacrifice into equity; they should not normally participate in schemes designed for the remuneration of executives. 2. Non-executive directors should not receive options or bonus payments. 3. Non-executive directors should not be provided with retirement	Y	

Does the company have a separate internal audit function?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (7) Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk		
	management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
	Ensuring the integrity of the essential reporting and monitoring systems will require the board to set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation. The board will also need to ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management. One way of doing this is through an internal audit system directly reporting		
Is the head of internal audit identified or, if outsourced, is the name of the external firm disclosed?	Companies often disclose that they have an internal audit but, in practice, it is not uncommon for it to exist more in form than in	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
Does the appointment and removal of the internal auditor require the approval of the Audit Committee?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (7) In some jurisdictions it is considered good practice for the internal auditors to report to an independent Audit Committee of the board or an equivalent body which is also responsible for managing the relationship with the external auditor, thereby allowing a coordinated response by the board.		
	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.D.7.9) Does the internal auditors have direct and unfettered access to the board of directors and its independent Audit Committee? ASX Principles on CG " companies should consider a second reporting line from the	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
	internal audit function to the board or relevant committee." Under the ASX Principles it is also recommended that the Audit Committee have access		
	to internal audit without the presence of management, and that "the audit committee should recommend to the board the appointment and dismissal of a chief internal audit executive."		
Risk Oversight			
Does the company disclose the internal control procedures/risk management systems it has in place?	Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
Does the Annual Report disclose that the board of directors/commissioners has conducted a review of the company's material controls (including operational, financial and compliance controls) and risk	UK CODE (JUNE 2010) C.2.1 The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company's risk management and internal control systems and should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all material controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls.	Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
Does the company disclose how key risks are managed?	(6) Foreseeable risk factors. Disclosure of risk is most effective when it is tailored to the particular	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
	managing risk is increasingly regarded as good practice.		
	In some jurisdictions it is considered good practice for the internal auditors to report to an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body which is also responsible for managing the relationship with the external auditor, thereby allowing a coordinated response by the board. It should also be regarded as good practice for this committee, or equivalent body, to review and report to the board the most critical accounting policies which are the basis for financial reports. However, the board should retain final responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the reporting systems. Some countries have	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI annual%20Report2016 2.pdf
People on the Board			
Do different persons assume the	OECD PRINCIPLE VI	V	Mr. Gener Luciano - GM
roles of chairman and CEO? Is the chairman an independent director/commissioner?	(E) The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on corporate affairs. In a number of countries with single tier board systems, the objectivity	Y	Msgr. Luciano Balagtas - Chairman http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
Has the chairman been the company CEO in the last three years?	strengthened by the separation of the role of chief executive and chairman, or, if these roles are combined, by designating a lead non-	N	
Are the role and responsibilities of the chairman disclosed?	ICGN: 2.5 Role of the Chair The chair has the crucial function of setting the right context in terms of board agenda, the provision of information to directors, and open boardroom discussions, to enable the directors to generate the effective board debate and discussion and to provide the constructive challenge which the company needs. The chair should work to create and maintain the culture of openness and constructive challenge which allows a diversity of views to be expressedThe chair should be available to shareholders for dialogue on key matters of the company's governance	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/ammended%20by %20laws.pdf
	identified or, if outsourced, is the name of the external firm disclosed? Does the appointment and removal of the internal auditor require the approval of the Audit Committee? Does the Company disclose the internal control procedures/risk management systems it has in place? Does the Annual Report disclose that the board of directors/commissioners has conducted a review of the company's material controls (including operational, financial and compliance controls) and risk Does the Company disclose how key risks are managed? Does the Company disclose how key risks are managed? People on the Board Board Chairman and CEO? Is the chairman been the company CEO in the last three years? Are the role and responsibilities of	onsure that there is appropriate oversight by serior management. One underfiled or, if outsourced, it the name of the external firm disclosed; it the name of the external firm disclosed; it the name of the external firm disclosed; it is the name of the external firm disclosed; it is the name of the external firm disclosed; it is unregulated, until the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated, until the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the board of directors when the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the board of directors when the external audit is unregulated and external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the board of directors when the external audit is unregulated and previous internal audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the board of directors when the external audit is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated in the board of directors when the external audit is unregulated and previous is unregulated. When the external audit is unregulated and	ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management. One was defended of internal audit. A companies of fended one that they have an internal audit that, in described or, if unabourced, is the same of the external firm disclosed? Companies of fended one that they have an internal audit that, in described, in the companies of the external audit that, in disclosed? In the companies of the control audit may be assigned to other them. The companies of the control audit may be assigned to other than the companies of the control audit may be assigned to other than the companies of the control audit to do so. Making the internal audit services which are not properly qualified to do so. Making the internal audit services which are not properly qualified to do so. Making the client of the internal audit control to do so. Making the client part of the internal audit to control the control and the control audit to the control audit to the control of the Audit Committee of the board of an equivalent above the appointment and removal of the Audit Committee. **COCOPINCER V. (D) (7)** **COCOPINCER V. (D) (7)* **ACC Vinciples as to Good the board of an equivalent audit to control the board of responsible for management and audit to control the board of responsible for management and the company disclose the board of discloses have direct and unfertered access to the board of discloses have direct and unfertered access to the board of discloses have direct and unfertered access to the board of the control and the specific part of the control of the board of responsibility of the company disclose the board of discloses of the company's material controls, including the independent audit, and that appropriate appropriate appears of the companies

E.4.6 Does the company disclose a board of directors/commissioners diversity policy? ASX Code Recommendation 3.2 Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and of the policy or a summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements for the board to establish measurable objectives achieving gender diversity and for the board to assess annually objectives and progress in achieving them. Regulations and codes of corporate governance in many developments now incorporate board diversity as a consideration in	ude es for ly both the eloped		
composition	i board	N/A	
E.5 Board Performance Directors Development			
E.5.1 Does the company have orientation programmes for new directors/commissioners? This item is in most codes of corporate governance.		Υ	All new ,e,ber of the Board of Trustee are required to attend a Seminar on Good Governance and Orientation Seminar
E.5.2 Does the company have a policy that encourages directors/commissioners to attend on-going or continuous professional education programmes? In order to improve board practices and the performance of it members, an increasing number of jurisdictions are now encour companies to engage in board training and voluntary self-evaluation that meets the needs of the individual company. This might individual company are changing commercial risks through in-house training and exterior changing commercial risks through in-house training and exterior changing commercial risks through in-house training and exterior companies to engage in board training and exterior changing commercial risks through in-house training and exterior changing cha	ts ouraging luation nclude that , and and	Υ	
CEO/Executive Management Appointments and Performance			
E.5.3 Does the company disclose how the board of directors/commissioners plans for the succession of the CEO/Managing Director/President and key management? OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (3) Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, key executives and overseeing succession planning. In two tier board systems the supervisory board is also responsappointing the management board which will normally compr	nsible for	Υ	
E.5.4 Does the board of directors/commissioners conduct an annual performance assessment of the CEO/Managing Director/President? Monitoring of governance by the board also includes continuo of the internal structure of the company to ensure that there a lines of accountability for management throughout the organic addition to requiring the monitoring and disclosure of corpora governance practices on a regular basis, a number of countries moved to recommend or indeed mandate self-assessment by I their performance as well as performance reviews of individual members and the CEO/Chairman.	ous review are clear iisation. In ate es have	Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
Board Appraisal			
E.5.5 Is an annual performance assessment conducted of the board of directors/commissioners? OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (2)		Y	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/PRAXIS%20FIDES%20 MBAI_annual%20Report2016_2.pdf
E.5.6 Does the company disclose the process followed in conducting the board assessment?		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/BOT%20performa nce%20scorecard%202015.pdf
E.5.7 Does the company disclose the criteria used in the board assessment? Director Appraisal		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/BOT%20performa nce%20scorecard%202015.pdf
E.5.8 Is an annual performance assessment conducted of individual director/commissioner? OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (2)		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/BOT%20performa nce%20scorecard%202015.pdf
E.5.9 Does the company disclose the process followed in conducting the director/commissioner assessment?		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/BOT%20performa nce%20scorecard%202015.pdf
E.5.10 Does the company disclose the criteria used in the director/commissioner assessment?		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/BOT%20performa nce%20scorecard%202015.pdf
Committee Appraisal E. S. 11 U.S. an appual performance U.K. CODE (U.N.E. 2010)			
E.5.11 Is an annual performance assessment conducted of the board of directors/commissioners committees? UK CODE (JUNE 2010) B.6 Evaluation: The board should undertake a formal and rigor annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its command individual directors.		Υ	http://praxisfidembai4.webs.com/2016committee% 20performance%20scorecard.pdf

Reference
Annual Report / Corporate Governance pg. 15-26
X. BOARD RESOLUTIONS
A. BOARD RESULUTIONS
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Annual Report Page 3

Annual Report Page 23
5. Review yearly and evaluation of the Strategic Plan of the Association as well as the Mission and Vision of the company.

Annual Report Page 23
5. Review yearly and evaluation of the Strategic Plan of the Association as well as the Mission and Vision of the company.

Annual Report Page 15-16

	Commitment to Good Corporate Governance
The ma the cor and	nual Report pg. 26 be Compliance Officer ensures the Board of Directors, inagement and employees are in compliance with a rules and regulations of regulatory agencies, that inpany policies and procedures are being followed, it that behavior in the organization meets the inpany's Standards of Conduct.
The det sub rec	nual Report pg. 26 The Compliance Officer shall be responsible for starting any violation of these provisions, and, so beet to the requirements of due process, shall commend to the Chairman of the Board propertion to be taken.
The exe cho Ass str aco	nual Report pg. 17 e Board of Trustees, composed of five (5) non- ecutive trustees and headed by a non-executive nirperson, derives its power from the General embly by means of elections, governs by means of ategic decisions, policies and oversight, and is fully countable to the General Assembly. (5 out of 7 BOT e Indeendent Trustee)
Tru are tru the tru ins of I mo res	nual Report pg. 17 Istees are the members' representatives and thus accountable to them. Once elected to the Board, a stee takes on fiduciary responsibilities and he is not are to represent specific interests. Sitting as a Board, stees provide strategic guidance to the corporation, titute policy directives or approve policy initiatives Management. They set standards of performance, initor and oversee company performance. They are ponsible for ensuring that Management is maging properly.
	nual Report pg.25
No Voi nai a te lim ma	mination Committee ting members fill up the ballots writing on it the me of candidates they choose or prefer. PFMBAI sets erm limit of nine (9) years for its directors and a it five (5) board seats that an individual director y hold simultaneously nual Report pg.25
No Voi nai a te lim	mination Committee ting members fill up the ballots writing on it the me of candidates they choose or prefer. PFMBAI sets erm limit of nine (9) years for its directors and a it five (5) board seats that an individual director by hold simultaneously

Annual Report pg.24

Nomination/ Election Committee

Annual Report pg.24

Nomination/ Election Committee Membership shall be composed of three (3)independent members, to be headed by any qualified member.

Annual Report pg.24

Nomination/ Election Committee

Membership shall be composed of three (3)independent members, to be headed by any

qualified member. Annual Report pg.24

Nomination/ Election Committee

Responsibilities:

1. Formulate rules and regulations governing the conduct of nominations and elections during the annual members' meeting, as well as in special elections should such occur.

2. Prepare and issue ballots to be used and supervise the conduct of elections.

3. Canvass the votes and proclaim the results of the

4. Certify the election returns to the Presiding Officer

Annual Report pg.25

Nomination/ Election Committee

For the year 2016, ELECOM held 3 meetings, Annual Report pg.25

Nomination/ Election Committee

See Table of Attendance

Annual Report pg.22 Remuneration/Compensation Committee

Annual Report pg.22

Remuneration/Compensation Committee

Membership shall be composed of three members, who are independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment

Annual Report pg.22

Remuneration/Compensation Committee Membership shall be composed of three members, who are independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment

Annual Report pg.22

Remuneration/Compensation Committee Membership shall be composed of three members, who are independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment

Annual Report pg.22

Remuneration/Compensation Committee For 2016, Remuneration and Compensation Committee held 2 meetings and attended by all

members. Annual Report pg.22

Remuneration/Compensation Committee For 2016, Remuneration and Compensation Committee held 2 meetings and attended by all members.

Annual Report pg.20-21

Audit Committee

Annual Report pg.20-21

Audit Committee

Membership is to be composed of three members, headed by an independent trustee, with all members having the ability to read financial reports, and preferably with accounting/legal/finance background.

Annual Report pg.20-21

Audit Committee

Membership is to be composed of three members, headed by an independent trustee, with all members having the ability to read financial reports, and preferably with accounting/legal/finance background.

Annual Report pg.20-21

Audit Committee

Annual Report pg.20-21

Audit Committee

Membership is to be composed of three members, headed by an independent trustee, with all members having the ability to read financial reports, and oreferably with accounting/legal/finance background.

Annual	Report pg.20-21
Audit Coi Audit Coi CPA	mmittee mmittee Chairman - Ms. Luciana Gonzales,
Audit Cor For the ye by Indepe	Report pg.20-21 mmittee ear 2016, Audit Committee comprised entirel endent Director and Non-Executive Member. mittee held eight (8) meetings in 2016.
Annual 1 Audit Cor	Report pg.20-21 mmittee
	e of Attendance
Audit Con . Review Statemer 2017 of v the finan for the ap MBAI, AN	Report pg.20-21 mmittee and approval of the Audited Financial ats 2016 which was released on March 15, which this is within the 120 days limit from cial year end. The committee also recommend oproval of external auditor of Praxis Fides MC and Associates was highly recommended mmittee, the fee based on the scope of work is
Annual 1	Report pg. 19
	of Meeting for 2017 - see table
Annual 1	Report pg. 19
	of Meeting for 2016 - see table ld 13 meetings for 2016
	Report pg. 19 of Meeting for 2016 - see table of attendance
	Report pg. 18
A quorun	erformance n of 2/3 is required for every meeting and for oval of board resolutions to be valid.
	Report pg. 18 arformance
The Chai without t	rman of the Board shall hold meetings the executives' presence to evaluate the
The Boar annually	es' performance. rd, led by an independent trustee, shall meet without the chairman's presence to appraise man's performance.
Board Pe All report	Report pg. 18 erformance ts and resolution are emailed five days in to all Trustee for them to review and further

Annual Report pg. 19 Schedule of Meeting for 2016 - see table
2000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 00
BOT - held 13 meetings for 2016
Annual Report pg. 19
Schedule of Meeting for 2016 - see table of attendance
Annual Report pg. 18
Board Performance A quorum of 2/3 is required for every meeting and for
the approval of board resolutions to be valid.
Annual Danayt no. 10
Annual Report pg. 18 Board Performance
The Chairman of the Board shall hold meetings
without the executives' presence to evaluate the executives' performance.
The Board, led by an independent trustee, shall meet
annually without the chairman's presence to appraise the chairman's performance.
Annual Report pg. 18
Board Performance
All reports and resolution are emailed five days in
advance to all Trustee for them to review and further study.

During the Actual Are Nominata the ELEC for Board Ms. Miran where the	ion / Election The Pre-Gener T	al Asseml al Assemb ee Hermin s, the Crit nominatio iscussed t embers pr	oly Meeting ly, Chairmo nia Mirand eria and Qu on and proc he conduct esent shall	an of illa discussed ualification clamation. of election
Nominat. During the Actual Are Nominat. the ELEC for Board Ms. Mirat where the	Report pg. 2 ion / Election ne Pre-Gener ion Committ OM circulars d candidate n ndilla also di e general me e for director	n Commit al Assemb al Assemb ee Hermin s, the Crit nominatio iscussed t embers pr	oly Meeting ly, Chairmo nia Mirand eria and Qu on and proc he conduct esent shall	an of illa discussed ualification clamation. of election
Remune Determin	Report pg.: eraition/Co ne and recom d schedule fo	mpensa amend for	Board app	proval the
meetings Coordina	nent, allowa , incentives o tors/Repres v or quasi-m	of Area entatives,	as well as	
Remune Determin policy an Managen meetings Coordina	Report pg.: raition/ Co ne and recom d schedule fo nent, allowa , incentives o ttors/Repres v or quasi-mo	ompensate amend for the compensation of the compensation of the content of Area entatives,	Board app npensation ustees and as well as	oroval the of committee

	Committee
	L Report pg.22
Audit (Committee
	L Report pg.22 Committee
Annua GM's R	L Report pg.29
PFMBA	I open doors for Risk Protection Programs &
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